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On Virtue Ethics. By Rosalind Hursthouse. New York: Oxford University Press, 
1999. Pp. 283. $35.00. 
 
This very engaging book is a steadily reasoned and pointed 
exploration of the logical structure and conceptual resources of neo-
Aristotelian virtue ethics. The investigation falls into three parts: 
whether and how virtue ethics can "guide action"; whether and how 
virtue ethics can give an account of "moral motivation" and the role of 
emotions; and whether, how, and to what extent the characteristically 
rational nature of human beings as a kind can provide objective 
justification for a conception of certain character traits as virtues. Each 
chapter poses, explores, and answers a particular question and so has 
a satisfying kind of completeness. 
 
Chapter 1 deftly defends the claim that virtue ethics provides 
action guidance, for each virtue generates a prescription and each vice 
a prohibition, and there are independent reasons not to expect more in 
the way of "codifiability" in ethics. Chapters 2 and 3 together offer a 
nuanced exploration of how virtue ethics guides or assesses action in 
hard cases or "dilemmas," resolvable or irresolvable. Tragic dilemmas, 
a distinct case, are not irresolvable even if they are resolvable only in 
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ways that mar nonetheless virtuous lives. Chapter 4 exposes a false 
contrast between Aristotle and Kant on the moral worth of acting from 
reason or inclination. The important difference between these 
philosophers is instead that Aristotle's moral psychology integrates 
emotions with our rational nature, as chapter 5 explains and illustrates 
with the apt case of racism. Chapters 6 and 7 offer an account of 
moral motivation, not as acting from a special kind of reason, but as 
acting on ranges of reasons characteristic of diverse virtues insofar as 
our dispositions to do so are fixed and permanent states. Yet virtue, 
Hursthouse claims, can be possessed to greater or lesser degrees. The 
"limited unity" of virtue means that the practical wisdom each virtue 
requires "cannot occur in discrete packs," even while it is not all or 
nothing. 
 
I found the "unity" view strained and seemingly at odds with 
repeated references to the fact of "patchiness" in individuals' 
characters. The claim that virtues and the practical wisdom which each 
involves may be possessed in different degrees is consistent with (at 
least limited) unity and coheres nicely with a developmental view of 
moral education. But references to agents who are "exemplary with 
respect to some virtues but not all" and to those who are "pretty" 
virtuous but whose exercise of virtue is "patchy" (149) are not 
obviously so consistent, and when one comes to the claim that "being 
particularly well endowed with respect to some virtues inevitably 
involves being not very well endowed in others" (213) or that "the 
exercise of at least one virtue figures much more largely and even at 
the expense of the exercise of others" (216), the supposed unity 
seems more than "limited." Hursthouse denies that practical wisdom 
comes in discrete packages, but she does not show that it is not 
context or task sensitive, even specific; similarly, that reasons for 
acting characteristic of a particular virtue really "crop" up across the 
ranges for other virtues (154) to the point where they are "not 
independent" (155) is stipulated but begs examination, Hursthouse 
concedes that people are not of a piece, but contemporary social 
psychology seems to suggest that character and practical wisdom 
might be more loosely configured or disparately responsive than this 
aspect of her view requires. 
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The final four chapters argue that a neo-Aristotelian naturalism 
can provide arguably objective, though not ethically neutral, grounds 
for holding certain traits to be virtues. Following Philippa Foot's lead 
that a thing's kind determines the criteria of goodness of such a thing, 
Hursthouse extends the "structure" of naturalistic evaluation to the 
ethical evaluation of rational social animals, i.e., human beings. 
Subject to some very important qualifications, we are "good human 
beings" when the traits of character that dispose our actions, 
emotions, and desires serve well our individual survival, the 
continuance of our species, freedom from pain and enjoyment 
characteristic of our kind, and the good functioning of our social group, 
all in the way characteristic of the kind we are. Our characteristic 
human "way" of living, however, is not one concrete way, given as it is 
for the other animals, but is already normative: it is "any way we can 
rightly see as good, as something we have reason to do" (221). 
Justification of reasons always proceeds from within a formed ethical 
outlook, significantly (but never completely) constrained by the ends 
our natural being sets, and is progressively self-correcting in a 
piecemeal, rather than wholesale, way (a "Neurathian procedure," 
165, 193). 
 
Hursthouse seems to assume a kind of normative functional 
unity of "the group"-a kind of natural teleology that adjusts the 
flourishing of individuals and groups to each other-so that groups 
function well which enable individuals to flourish (201-02). The final 
chapter, however, confronts the issue of "harmony" within and among 
us squarely (251). For Hursthouse, to reject the view that "human 
nature is harmonious, that we can flourish or achieve eudaimonia, that 
we can do it in the same way as each other, that we can do so 
together, and not at each other's expense" (264) is "moral nihilism." 
She sets up as her foil some remarks of Bernard Williams to the effect 
that Darwinism (that other naturalism) suggests that there is no 
teleology at all and that we are to some degree "a mess." I find this 
dilemma false: the alternative to teleology is not necessarily "a mess"; 
"ethical evaluation" itself does not collapse with the rejection of natural 
teleology, leaving practical reason with nothing "substantial or long-
term to do" (262). The practical tasks facing our necessarily social 
rationality and our deeply social emotional nature are certainly 
daunting, and our capacities modest. Our individual and shared lives 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
International Philosophical Quarterly, Vol 41, No. 4 (December 2001): pg. 493-495. DOI. This article is © Philosophy 
Documentation Center and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. 
Philosophy Documentation Center does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted 
elsewhere without the express permission from Philosophy Documentation Center. 
4 
 
may be scenes of inescapable negotiation, costly trade-offs, and 
unpredictable conflict. It does not follow that there are not better and 
worse ways to live together, as we must; nor does this preclude there 
being differences between reasons that can rightly be seen in common 
among us as reasons and others that cannot. In an interesting finale, 
Hursthouse has a belief in harmony as a kind of practical postulate and 
as an expression of the virtue of hope. 
 
This book is exemplary for its lucid organization, clarity of style, 
straightforward argumentation, and consistently temperate and 
constructive tone. In the introduction Hursthouse expresses the hope 
that the book will be used as a text, "helping to familiarize up-and-
coming students with virtue ethics' distinctive approach to a variety of 
problems and issues in moral philosophy" (17). The book she has 
written can serve that purpose nicely, but it is a substantial 
contribution to contemporary discussion not only of virtue ethics but 
also of ethical theory. It ranges over issues of moral psychology, moral 
education, the limits of codifying moral judgment, the nature of 
justification and objectivity, and the meaning of (one kind of) 
naturalism. It repeatedly sounds the Aristotelian theme "that we were 
all once children" (14) to good effect. As obvious as it sounds, this 
home truth is not often mentioned or honored in moral philosophy, but 
Hursthouse puts it to work at several points in her arguments 
concerning moral learning, emotions, motivations, and judgment. 
Hurst house writes so clearly that this book can be read with great 
pleasure and deceptive ease; it is in fact densely argued, and its points 
are often challenging. Anyone interested in fundamental issues of 
moral philosophy will find this book a stimulating study; for 
understanding virtue ethics, it is essential. 
 
 
